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CASENOTES
MARITIME LAW - LAND-BASED NEGLIGENCE STANDARD
OF CARE ESTABLISHED IN A LONGSHOREMAN'S THIRD
PARTY ACTION AGAINST VESSEL OWNER UNDER THE
LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSA-
TION ACT OF 1972. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. Santos, 451
U.S. 156 (1981).
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act (LHWCA)' limited an injured longshoreman's
cause of action against a vessel owner to negligence.' However, these
amendments failed to state the standard of care required of the vessel
owner.' Consequently, the federal courts have struggled with establish-
ing the proper standard of care that is to be applied in a longshore-
man's third party negligence action against a vessel owner.4 In Scindia
Steam Navigation Co. v. Santosi the Supreme Court held that a vessel
owner has no general duty to discover dangerous conditions that de-
velop within the confines of the operations assigned to the stevedore.6
However, where the dangerous condition becomes known to the vessel
owner, he will under certain circumstances have a duty to act when the
dangerous condition arises from the malfunctioning of the vessel's gear
1. Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251 (amending 33 U.S.C.
§§ 901-950 (1970)).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976). Section 905(b) of the Act provides:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused
by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise enti-
tled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against
such vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions of Section
933 of this title, and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for
such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to
the contrary shall be void. If such person was employed by the vessel to
provide stevedoring services, no such action shall be permitted if the in-
jury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing steve-
doring services to the vessel. If such person was employed by the vessel
to provide ship building or repair services, no such action shall be per-
mitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in
providing ship building or repair services to the vessel. The liability of
the vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of
seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred. The
remedy provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of all other reme-
dies against the vessel except remedies available under this chapter.
3. See id
4. See, e.g., Comment, Shiowner Liability Under Section 905(b) of the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act." A Proposed Standard of Care, 9
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 323 (1980); Comment, Negligence Standards Under the 1972
Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: Ex-
amining the Viewpoints, 21 VILL. L. REV. 244 (1976).
5. 451 U.S. 156 (1981).
6. Id at 172. A stevedore is one who is responsible for unloading a ship in port.
WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 860 (1965).
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being used in the stevedore operations.7 This casenote examines the
standards of care adopted by the federal circuit courts, analyzes Scindia
in light of those standards, and evaluates the impact this decision will
have on future negligence actions brought under the LHWCA.8
II. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Santos, a longshoreman and employee of the Seattle Stevedore
Company, was injured while loading a vessel owned by Scindia Steam
Navigation Company. 9 On the day of the accident, his task was to re-
move sacks of wheat from a pallet board' 0 that was lowered into the
hatch by a winch" and then properly stow the sacks of wheat."2 The
winch that was being used, which was part of the ship's gear, was mal-
functioning to the extent that when the brakes were applied, it would
not come to a complete stop.' 3 The accident which caused Santos' inju-
ries occurred when a pallet board failed to stop until it hit a pallet
jack,' 4 spilling half the sacks of wheat from the pallet.'5 The hatch
tender, believing the remaining sacks were secure enough not to fall,
ordered the winch operator to raise the pallet about fifteen feet. Santos
and three other longshoremen were permitted to clear away the spilled
sacks. A few minutes later, more sacks fell from the pallet, striking and
injuring Santos. 6
Santos instituted a third party action against Scindia Steam Navi-
gation Company for negligence pursuant to section 905(b) of the
7. 451 U.S. 156, 175-76 (1981).
8. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
9. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 158 (1981).
10. A pallet is "a portable platform of wood or other material for handling, storage, or
movement of materials and packages in warehouses, factories, or vehicles." WEB-
STER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 606 (1965).
11. A winch is "a powerful machine with one or more drums on which to coil a rope,
cable or chain for hauling or hoisting." Id at 1022.
12. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 160 (1981).
13. Santos' accident occurred on December 10, 1972. The winch driver had com-
plained to his foreman on December 8th that the brakes were not holding on the
winches; instead, they would travel several more feet before the brakes could stop
the descent of the load. Brief for Respondent at 4-7, Scindia Steam Navigation
Co. v. Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981).
14. "A pallet jack is a small, wheeled, cartlike vehicle with prongs on the front like a
forklift with which the longshoremen in the hold would cart the pallet load to the
wings of the hold where they would then remove the sacks and stow them by
hand." Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 160 (1981).
15. Id
16. Id Three sacks struck Santos, one hitting him in the back of the neck. Brief for
Respondent at 6, Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981).
There was some disagreement as to whether the additional sacks fell because
of the braking mechanism allowing the suspended pallet to slip a few times, work-
ing loose the additional sacks that fell, or whether the additional sacks fell because
the pallet board was swinging back and forth. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v.
Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 160 (1981).
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LHWCA. 17 The United States District Court for the Western District
of Washington, applying the Restatement standard, 18 held that there
was no genuine issue as to any material facts and entered judgment in
favor of Scindia Steam Navigation Company. 9 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, reversing the district court, held
that the controlling standard for actions brought under section 905(b) is
a "reasonable care under the circumstances approach."2 Under this
view, the court of appeals found that there were material facts in dis-
pute that were to be resolved by a jury.2
1
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Early Development
For many years, the longshoremen's work of unloading and load-
ing vessels was treated as a non-maritime activity.22 But in 1914, the
Supreme Court announced that actions by longshoremen against steve-
dores for injuries were to be subject to admiralty jurisdiction.23 At this
17. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 343, 343A (1965).
19. 451 U.S. 156, 162 (1981). The standard applied by the district court was as
follows:
[A] shipowner is not liable for dangerous conditions created by the steve-
dore's negligence while the stevedore was in exclusive control over the
manner and the area of the work. . . nor is the shipowner under a duty
to warn the stevedore or his employees of dangers or open and obvious
defects which are known to the stevedore or his employees or which are
so obvious and apparent that they may reasonably be expected to dis-
cover them.
1976 A.M.C. 2583, 2585 (W.D. Wash. 1976), rey'd, 598 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1979),
aff'd, 451 U.S. 156 (1981).
20. 598 F.2d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 1979), af'd, 451 U.S. 156 (1981). The "reasonable care
under the circumstances approach" includes the following standard:
A vessel is subject to liability for injuries to longshoremen working on or
near the vessel caused by conditions on the vessel if, but only if, the
shipowner (a) knows of, or by the exercise of reasonable care would dis-
cover, the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable
risk of harm to such longshoremen, and (b) the shipowner fails to exer-
cise reasonable care under the circumstances to protect the longshore-
men against the danger.
Id.
21. Id at 489. The Supreme Court stated that the court of appeals found the follow-
ing facts to be in dispute:
[Wlhether the shipowner knew or should have known of the defective
winch; whether Seattle was in exclusive control of the loading in the
sense that only Seattle could have repaired the winch; whether the defec-
tive operation of the winch had caused the initial spillage of the sacks,
thus necessitating a cleanup, or had later been the proximate cause of the
additional sacks falling from the pallet and injuring Santos.
451 U.S. 156, 164 (1981); see Santos v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 598 F.2d
480, 489-91 (9th Cir. 1979), afl'd, 451 U.S. 156 (1981).
22. See Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 COR-
NELL L.Q. 381 (1954).
23. Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 61-62 (1914).
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time, there were no applicable compensation statutes under admiralty
law.24 In 1917, three states' workmen's compensation statutes passed
constitutional muster25 and Congress attempted to provide longshore-
men coverage under these systems.26 Each time, the Supreme Court
held that longshoremen could not receive the benefits of state compen-
sation because of the need for federal uniformity in maritime matters.27
Consequently, throughout the mid-1920's, longshoremen lacked any
remedy for injuries that occurred on the job.2" The Supreme Court's
reaction to the longshoremen's dilemma was manifested in the 1926
decision of International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty,29 where the Court
held that longshoremen were seamen and, therefore, were within the
coverage of the Jones Act.3 ° Congressional reaction to this decision
came quickly and, in 1927, the LHWCA was enacted.3'
The LHWCA, similar to most workmen's compensation statutes,
made compensation benefits the longshoreman's exclusive remedy
against the stevedore,32 thus eliminating the longshoremen's newly ac-
quired cause of action under the Jones Act. In addition, the LHWCA
provided that longshoremen could bring an action against any third
party who may have caused their injuries,3 3 but it did not specify under
what theory the third party action could be brought. Initially, third
party actions under the LHWCA were based in negligence and were
usually brought against the vessel owner.
34
This scheme began to change in 1946, when the Supreme Court
announced in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki35 that the warranty of sea-
worthiness was available to longshoremen injured while performing
traditional seamen tasks.36 Since the warranty of seaworthiness be-
came a type of liability without fault,3 7 and thus easier to prove, most
third party actions against the vessel owner after Sieracki were brought
24. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 438 (2d ed. 1975).
25. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S.
210 (1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
26. Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 216, 42 Stat. 634 (1922); Act of October 6, 1917, ch. 97,
405 Stat. 395 (1917).
27. See Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
28. Comment, The Injured Longshoreman vs. The Shipowner After 1972: Business Invi-
tees, Land-Based Standards, and Assumption of Risk, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 771, 774
(1977).
29. 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
30. Id The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976), is the seaman's remedy for personal
injuries caused by negligence by the vessel.
31. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, §§ 1-51, 44
Stat. 1424 (1927) (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976)).
32. Id § 5, 44 Stat. at 1426.
33. Id § 33a, 44 Stat. at 1440.
34. See, e.g., Anderson v. Lorentzen, 160 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1947); The Etna, 43 F.
Supp. 303 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
35. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
36. Id at 99.
37. For a discussion of the warranty of seaworthiness, see Chamlee, The Absolute
19821
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under the theory of unseaworthiness rather than negligence.3"
The Sieracki decision led the way for circumvention of the exclu-
sive remedy provision of the LHWCA. In 1956, responding to the
heavy burden placed on the vessel owners under the unseaworthiness
doctrine,3 9 the Supreme Court held that when a vessel owner was
found liable because of unseaworthiness, the stevedore could be sued
for indemnification when the injury was caused by him.4" Thus, the
stevedore was paying twice for the same injury, through compensation
benefits and indemnification. In 1963, the Supreme Court held that a
longshoreman hired directly by the charterer of a vessel could sue his
employer under the doctrine of unseaworthiness,4' resulting in a com-
plete destruction of the provisions of the LHWCA.
B. The 1972 Amendments
Congressional response to the judicial destruction of the exclusive
remedy provision of the 1927 Act and the subsequent flood of litigation
was the enactment of the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA.42 Under
section 905(b) it was provided that third party actions by longshoremen
against vessel owners are to be based in negligence.4 3 The unseawor-
thiness remedy has been eliminated and indemnity actions by the ves-
sel owner against the stevedoring companies are prohibited." Thus,
Congress has specifically provided that compensation benefits are the
longshoremen's exclusive remedy against the stevedore.
Problems under the 1972 amendments have not arisen under the
exclusive remedy provision dealing with stevedores, but with the negli-
gence cause of action against third parties. Although the 1972 amend-
ments made it clear that a negligence action is the longshoremen's
exclusive remedy against vessel owners, Congress failed to provide any
specific statutory language as to the standard of care to be used.45
Thus, the federal courts have been faced with the task of determining
Warranty of Seaworthiness. A History and Comparative Study, 24 MERCER L.
REv. 519 (1973).
38. See Comment, The Vessel Owner's Standard of Care under the 1972 Amendments
to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 23 Loy. L. REV.
986, 988 (1977).
39. The unseaworthiness doctrine enabled a vessel owner to be found liable even
where the stevedore had caused the unseaworthy condition. See Alaska S.S. Co.
v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954), afl'g 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953).
40. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 132-35 (1956).
41. Reed v. Steamship Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 414 (1963).
42. Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251 (amending 33 U.S.C.
§§ 901-950 (1970)). The purpose of these amendments was to upgrade the bene-
fits, extend the compensation coverage to protect additional workers, promulgate
necessary administrative reforms, and provide a specified cause of action for dam-
ages against third parties. Brief for Respondent at I-1, Scindia Steam Navigation
Co. v. Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981).
43. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976). For the text of § 905(b), see note 2 supra.
44. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
45. See id
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whether the appropriate standard of care is to be derived from mari-
time negligence concepts or from land-based liability principles.46 Al-
though Congress chose to entrust the judiciary with the responsibility
of developing a standard of care,47 the courts are limited to developing
the standard of care in accordance with federal law.48 Therefore, the
courts are to apply only the admiralty concept of comparative negli-
gence in any case where the injured longshoreman's negligence may
have contributed to his injuries. 9
Although for several years after the enactment of the 1972 amend-
ments the federal courts avoided the enunciation of any specific stan-
dard of care in third party actions against the vessel owner,5 ° two basic
schools of thought have recently developed. 5 ' Following the lead of
the Second Circuit, a majority of courts have either explicitly or implic-
itly adopted sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
as the appropriate standard of care owed by a vessel owner to the
longshoremen.
52
In Evans v. Transportacion Maritime Mexicana S. S. "Campeche" 13
the Second Circuit re-evaluated section 905(b) and found a congres-
sional intent to place vessel owners in the same position when sued as
their land-based counterparts.5 4 The court construed this as requiring a
direct application of land-based tort concepts and, therefore, section
343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was the most appropriate
standard for determining negligence under section 905(b). 5 Using the
Restatement standard, the Evans court found that a vessel owner is not
"liable for injuries resulting from known or obvious dangers unless the
46. See, e.g., Riddle v. Exxon Transp. Co., 563 F.2d 1103, 1109-10 (4th Cir. 1977).
47. H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4698, 4704.
Under this standard, as adopted by the Committee, there will of course,
be disputes as to whether the vessel was negligent in a particular case.
Such issues can only be resolved through the application of accepted
principles of Tort Law and the ordinary process of litigation - just as
they are in cases involving alleged negligence by land-based third
parties.
Id
48. H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4698, 4705.
49. Id
50. Comment, Shipowner Liability Under Section 905(b) of the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: 4 Proposed Standard of Care, 9 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 323, 330 (1980).
51. See text accompanying notes 52-63 infra.
52. At present, the Second, Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Circuits have adhered to the
reasoning of sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement. See, e.g., Giglio v. Farrell
Lines, Inc., 613 F.2d 429, 431-32 (2d Cir. 1980); Stockstill v. Gypsum Transp., 607
F.2d 1112, 1116 (5th Cir. 1979); Clemons v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., 596 F.2d
746, 748-49 (7th Cir. 1979); Riddle v. Exxon Transp. Co., 563 F.2d 1103, 1111-12
(4th Cir. 1977).
53. 639 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1981).
54. See id at 851-52.
55. Id at 855.
19821
Baltimore Law Review
shipowner should anticipate the harm despite the obviousness of the
danger."56 Thus, there is no liability where the vessel owner has no
notice of the defect.57 However, the vessel owner must take steps to
protect the longshoremen where the defect is non-obvious or concealed
and he knows of the defect which presents an unreasonable risk of
harm.58 When the dangerous defect arises during the stevedoring oper-
ations, the vessel owner must act when he reasonably anticipates that
the longshoremen will not be able to avoid the dangerous condition.59
Ordinarily, the vessel owner may rely on the stevedore to perform his
job in a safe manner, but under certain circumstances it would be un-
reasonable for the vessel owner to rely on the stevedore to remedy the
dangerous condition.6"
On the other hand, the minority of courts have interpreted the leg-
islative history of section 905(b)6' as requiring a uniform body of negli-
gence law derived from analogies to land-based concepts.62
Accordingly, these courts have applied the uniform maritime standard
of reasonable care under the circumstances.
63
IV. THE SCINDIA COURT'S HOLDING
In Scindia, I the Supreme Court, for the first time since the enact-
ment of the 1972 amendments, addressed the problem of what standard
of care is applicable in third party actions by longshoremen against a
vessel owner under section 905(b).65 Noting the considerable disagree-
ment among federal courts as to the construction and application of
section 905(b),66 Justice White, who delivered the opinion of the
Court,
6 7 recognized that the section's language and its legislative his-
56. Id
57. Id
58. 1d, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965).
59. 639 F.2d 848, 856 (2d Cir. 1981).
60. Id The court gave several examples of when the shipowner should intervene.
Such circumstances include:
Where the dangerous condition would be too difficult for the steve-
dore alone to remedy, or where the custom in the industry places the
burden of acting on the shipowner, or the ship affirmatively joins in the
decision to continue despite the hazard, it would not be realistic to say
that the shipowner's reliance on the stevedore is justified.
Id
61. H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4698, 4703.
62. See Johnson v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 334, 348 (1st Cir. 1980); Griffith v.
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 610 F.2d 116, 125 (3d Cir. 1979); Lawson v.
United States, 605 F.2d 448, 452 (9th Cir. 1979)..
63. See note 20 supra for text of reasonable care under the circumstances standard.
64. 451 U.S. 156 (1981).
65. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
66. 451 U.S. 156, 165 (1981).
67. The Court's opinion was joined by all of the other members of the Court except
Justice Burger, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Jus-
tice Brennan filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Marshall and Blackmun
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tory did not provide any guidance for the judiciary to apply a specific
standard of care.68
After acknowledging the vessel owner's duty of care "under the
circumstances" to provide reasonably safe equipment and working
conditions for the stevedore, 69 the Court turned its attention to the ves-
sel owner's duty under section 905(b) after the stevedore's cargo opera-
tions have begun.7" Scindia had contended that the vessel owner has
no duty to either supervise and inspect the stevedore's cargo operations
or to exercise reasonable care to discover and correct dangerous condi-
tions that develop during the stevedore's operations. 7 Santos coun-
tered with the court of appeals' rationale that the vessel owner has a
continuing duty to use reasonable care in discovering dangerous condi-
tions and to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to protect
the longshoremen.72
The Scindia Court quickly rejected Santos' view of a continuing
general duty to supervise and inspect because it would place a nondele-
gable duty on the shipowner which Congress sought to eliminate by
enacting the 1972 amendments.73 Implicitly responding to Scindia's ar-
gument, the Court acknowledged the vessel owner's right to expect that
the stevedore would avoid exposing the longshoremen to unreasonable
dangers and that the stevedore would perform his tasks properly with-
out supervision by the shipowner.7 In fight of the stevedore's duty, the
Court concluded that, except where modified by positive law, customs,
or contract provisions, the shipowner has no general duty to exercise
reasonable care to discover, by supervision or inspection, dangerous
conditions that develop during the stevedore's cargo operations in areas
that are assigned to the stevedore.75
The more difficult issue addressed by the Court was the vessel
owner's duty to the longshoremen upon learning of a dangerous condi-
tion in the cargo operations that is also known to the stevedore, which
may cause injury to the longshoremen.76 Scindia argued that the vessel
owner is entitled to rely on the expertise of the stevedore and, therefore,
is not liable for injuries caused by dangers known by or obvious to the
stevedore.77 Although the Court found support for this position in past
cases, 78 it recognized that both the Ninth and Second Circuits have re-
joined. Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Rehnquist
joined.
68. Id
69. Id at 166-67.
70. Id at 167.
71. Id
72. Id at 168.
73. Id at 169.
74. Id at 170.
75. Id at 172.
76. Id at 172-73.
77. Id at 173.
78. Id (citing Crumady v. The J.H. Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959)).
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jected this argument. 79 Recognizing the difference between the two cir-
cuits' positions, the Scindia Court adopted the position of the Second
Circuit, as stated in Evans v. Transportacion Maritime Mexicana S. S
"Campeche .o but limited the vessel owner's duty to act where the ves-
sel owner knows or should know of the malfunction of the ship's gear
being used in the cargo operations8 and it would be "improvident" not
to act because the stevedore failed to act reasonably. 82 Support for this
position arises from safety and health regulations that are applied to
longshoring. These regulations require that visibly unsafe gear shall
not be used until safe.8 More specifically, the regulations require that
when a winch is unable to hold the load it shall not be used, but such
defect should be reported to the officer in charge of the vessel.84 Thus,
under the regulations the shipowner has the duty to repair the winch
and should intervene if it is aware of the condition.
The two concurring opinions in Scindia were generally consistent
with the Court's opinion. The opinion by Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Marshall and Blackmun,85 reiterated the standards set out in
Justice White's holding.86 However, the concurring opinion went one
step further and specified what the shipowner must do when it knows
of the dangerous condition and has a reasonable belief that the steve-
dore will not remedy the condition.87 The opinion by Justice Powell,
with whom Justice Rehnquist joined,88 emphasized the distinction be-
tween the standard adopted by the Court and the "reasonableness stan-
dard" embraced by the Ninth Circuit.89
V. ANALYSIS
In Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. Santos,9 ° the Supreme Court
was presented with the opportunity to clarify an area of the law that
has created disagreement between the circuits9 and has received atten-
tion from legal commentators.92 Scindia indicates the present unwill-
ingness of the Court to specifically set forth the appropriate standard
79. Id at 174.
80. 639 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1981). See text accompanying notes 53-60 supra.
81. 451 U.S. 156, 175 (1981).
82. Id
83. 29 C.F.R. § 1918.51(b) (1980).
84. Id § 1918.53(a)(5).
85. 451 U.S. 156, 179 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
86. Id
87. Id (Brennan, J., concurring). "[T]he shipowner has a duty either to halt the
stevedoring operation, to make the stevedore eliminate the unsafe condition, or to
eliminate the unsafe condition itself." Id
88. Id at 180 (Powell, J., concurring).
89. Id
90. 451 U.S. 156 (1981).
91. For a general discussion of all the standards applied throughout the circuits, see
Annot., 50 A.L.R. FED. 278 (1980).
92. See, e.g., Gorman, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
- After the 1972 Amendments, 6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1 (1974); Comment, The
[Vol. 11
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for all actions brought under section 905(b) of the LHWCA. The opin-
ion announced very narrow holdings, applicable primarily to defective
ship's gear, with no indication of what position would be taken under
different factual circumstances.
One of the more significant aspects of the Scindia decision was the
reaffirmance of principles established prior to the 1972 amendments of
the LHWCA.93 In Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping
Co., 94 the Supreme Court held that a shipowner owed a duty to the
stevedore and his longshoremen to exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances. Not only did the Scindia Court reiterate this position, it
also stated that this duty requires the shipowner to have the ship and its
equipment in such condition that the stevedore will be able to carry on
cargo operations with reasonable safety.95 The Scindia opinion also
reestablished the principle that the shipowner has a duty to warn of
known, non-obvious dangers that may be encountered during the cargo
operations. 96 This standard appears to be based on the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, sections 343 and 343A,97 but is stated in the context
of stevedoring operations.
The first holding announced by the Scindia Court, that a ship-
owner has no general duty to supervise or inspect stevedoring opera-
tions to discover dangerous conditions, is subject to several exceptions.
These exceptions - positive law, contract provision or custom - may
alter this no-duty rule to a duty to discover dangerous defects that de-
velop during the stevedoring operations.9" Positive law apparently re-
fers to any applicable statutes and regulations that have been enacted. 99
The contract provision exception seems to apply to the right of the ves-
sel owner and stevedore to contract for imposing a duty on the owner
to inspect during the stevedoring operations."° The third exception,
custom, might be invoked when it is shown that in the particular area it
is a practice in the ordinary course of business to conduct regular in-
spections of the stevedoring operation.' 0' In addition, the Court's
enunciation of the shipowner's precise duty includes modifying lan-
guage that raises more questions than it effectively answers. The ship-
owner has no "general" duty to inspect or correct faulty equipment, 1
0 2
implying that beyond the positive law, contract and custom exceptions,
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act and the Invitee Standard-
Maritime Law Gone Aground 53 WASH. L. REV. 663 (1978).
93. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 167 (1981).
94. 394 U.S. 404 (1969).
95. 451 U.S. 156, 167 (1981).
96. Id
97. Brief for Petitioner at 13-14, Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. Santos, 451 U.S.
156 (1981).
98. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 172 (1981).
99. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1046 (5th ed. 1979).
100. See Moore v. Smotkin, 79 Ariz. 77, 80, 283 P.2d 1029, 1030 (1955).
101. See Goslin v. Kurn, 351 Mo. 395, 173 S.W.2d 79 (1943).
102. 451 U.S. 156, 172 (1981).
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there will be other circumstances in which the court may find excep-
tions to this no-duty rule.
Another limitation on the holding is that there is no duty to dis-
cover dangerous conditions that develop during the cargo opera-
tions.103 Therefore, the shipowner should realize that with every
dangerous condition there will be a question of whether it developed
before or after the start of the cargo operations to determine if the ship-
owner owed any duty to the stevedore. Finally, no duty exists if the
condition develops within the confines of the cargo operations that are
assigned to the stevedore.' °4 Due to the ambiguity of "confines" and
"assigned," the actual meaning of these two words, when applied to
factual situations, will ultimately have to be defined by the Court.
The second holding in Scindia, that there may be circumstances
which require the shipowner to act, where he knows of the dangerous
condition and where he may not reasonably assume that the stevedore
will correct a malfunction of the ship's gear, 0 5 seems to apply the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, section 343A. Although the Court appar-
ently endorsed the Second Circuit's position,'I 6 the opinion sidestepped
the actual adoption of the Restatement, sections 343 and 343A.1°7 It
has been argued, however, that the Restatement standard is antithetical
to section 905(b)."'0 This stems from the legislative intent that a plain-
tifi's recovery should be limited by the concept of comparative negli-
gence,10 9 while the authors of the Restatement have clearly indicated
that contributory negligence and assumption of risk have a direct bear-
ing upon liability under sections 343 and 343A.11l
In situations that involve dangerous conditions arising from defec-
tive ship's gear, it still is not clear under what circumstances the ship-
owner should act. The operative test used by the Scindia Court leaves
the shipowner's duty to intervene a factual question,"' placing the
shipowner in a very awkward position. However, any positive law on
the subject may control. After Scindia the shipowner should at least
103. Id
104. Id
105. Id at 175.
106. Evans v. Transportacion Maritime Mexicana S.S. "Campeche", 639 F.2d 848 (2d
Cir. 1981).
107. 451 U.S. 156, 168 n.14 (1981).
108. Johnson v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 334, 347 (1st Cir. 1980); Griffith v.
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 610 F.2d 116, 125 (3d Cir. 1979); Gallardo v.
Westfal-Larsen & Co., 435 F. Supp. 484, 492 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
109. See Brief for Respondent at 1-12, Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. Santos, 451
U.S. 156 (1981).
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343, Comment d (1965); id § 343A, Com-
ment d. But see Evans v. Transportacion Maritime Mexicana S.S. "Campeche",
639 F.2d 848, 857 n.10 (2d Cir. 1981) (where the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence is observed, there should be no problem in applying § 343A).
111. See Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 175-78 (1981); Evans
v. Transportation Maritime Mexicana S.S. "Campeche", 639 F.2d 848, 857 (2d
Cir. 1981).
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intervene whenever he knows of a dangerous condition arising from
malfunctioning ship's gear, if the stevedore continues to work." 1
2
The Court gave no indication as to whether it will adopt the same
position if factual circumstances other than ship's gear are involved.
This could mean that when the Court is presented with circumstances
not involving ship's gear, it will extend the Scindia holding and, there-
fore, may eventually fully implement the Second Circuit's "anticipa-
tion theory." However, the Court stated that the possible duty to
intervene may entail an examination of the regulations as to who has
the right and duty to make a given repair. 3 Therefore, regulations or
positive law may also play an active part in helping to define the duty
to intervene in circumstances where the dangers arise from something
other than the ship's gear.
14
VI. CONCLUSION
In Scindia the Supreme Court held that shipowners have no gen-
eral duty during cargo operations to inspect for dangerous conditions
that may develop, subject to the requirement that when a shipowner
becomes aware of a dangerous condition arising from malfunctioning
ship's gear, he may have a duty to act. These holdings, being very lim-
ited in scope, leave many questions that will ultimately have to be an-
swered. However, the Scindia Court establishes that the negligence
standard of care is to be a land-based one. Therefore, the jurisdictions
that adhere to the Restatement (Second) of Torts position have properly
interpreted the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA. Accordingly, the
maritime reasonable care under the circumstances approach is rejected.
Whether the Scindia holding will be extended to encompass other dan-
gerous conditions is yet to be seen. It seems probable that the Court
will adopt a position close to that of the Second Circuit. However, un-
til that time, the need for uniformity in maritime law will not be met.
Julia C. Neal
112. See note 60 suprtz
113. 451 U.S. 156, 177-76 (1981).
114. Id
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